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In 2009, Professor Richard L. Marcus said, “electronic discovery is the 
hottest topic in litigation today.”1  The December 2006 amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were the first to employ a “full package of  
E-Discovery rule[s].”2  Although the increased usage and acceptance of  
e-discovery has brought benefits to the discovery process, the nature of 
                                           
 + J. Hadley Edgar Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law.  I thank Richard L. 
Marcus for reading and commenting on this Article.  I also thank my colleagues Jennifer Bard 
and Jarod Gonzales for their comments and Benjamin G. Robertson, J.D., 2012, for his excellent 
assistance in research and citation. 
 1. Richard L. Marcus, Introduction to SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., ELECTRONIC 
DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (2009).  Professor Marcus, 
serving as a special reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, was a primary drafter of 
the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which specifically address the 
discovery of electronically stored information (ESI).  Id. at 1 n.1. 
 2. See Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery and Beyond: Toward Brave New World or 1984?, 
236 F.R.D. 598, 604–05 (2006) (describing, contemporaneously to their enactment, how the  
e-discovery rule amendments of 2006 “could be the first big step into the world of digital 
litigation”). 
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digitized information has also increased the risk and occurrence of evidence 
spoliation.3  The spoliation of evidence subverts the discovery process and the 
integrity of the courts.4  In the rapidly expanding universe of electronically 
stored information (ESI), some courts are concerned that the advent of  
e-discovery will lead to a flood of motions seeking sanctions for spoliation of 
evidence, thereby increasing the costs and delays of litigation.5  Additionally, 
rule makers are concerned with consistency among the federal circuits in 
addressing a wide range of spoliation issues.6  The Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules and its Discovery Subcommittee are presently considering new 
                                           
 3. Shira A. Scheindlin & Kanchana Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery Sanctions in the 
Twenty-First Century, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 71, 71–72 (2004) (explaining how 
digitized information is often deleted or overwritten in the normal course of business and is 
therefore more likely to be destroyed than hardcopies of information).  The Second Circuit has 
defined spoliation as “the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to 
preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.”  
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting West v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)).  The trial judge has discretion to 
order sanctions and can determine the extent to which those sanctions are imposed.  Id. (quoting 
Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)).  This authority is a product 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the inherent powers of the court.  Id. 
 4. SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN A 
NUTSHELL 218, 236 (2009) (discussing the many opportunities for evidence to be destroyed and 
the associated sanctions). 
 5. See, e.g., Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607  
(S.D. Tex. 2010).  However, research by the Federal Judicial Center suggests that  
sanctions motions for spoliation are relatively rare.  EMERY G. LEE, III, FED. JUDICIAL  
CTR., MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS BASED UPON SPOLIATION IN CIVIL CASES: REPORT TO THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 3–4 (2011), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/leespoli.pdf/$file/leespoli.pdf.  The scope of the study 
included court records in 131,992 civil cases from nineteen federal district courts between 2007 
and 2008.  Id. at 4.  The study found that sanctions motions were filed in only 153 cases.  Id. at 8.  
Of the sixty-five sanctions motions actually ruled on in cases involving ESI, thirty-four percent 
were granted and sixty-six percent were denied.  Id.  The most commonly imposed sanction was 
an adverse-inference instruction.  Id. at 9.  The study showed that cases with sanctions motions 
were more contentious and had longer disposition times, averaging 649 days compared with 253 
for civil cases in general.  Id.  Moreover, 0.6% of civil cases in general were disposed of at trial, 
while a remarkable 16.5% of the spoliation cases went to trial.  Id. 
 6. See Memorandum from the Judicial Conference Subcomm. on Discovery,  
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to Mini-Conference on Pres. & Sanctions 1 (Sept. 9,  
2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/DallasMiniConf_ 
Materials/Preservation-Sanction%20Issues.pdf [hereinafter Memo on Pres. & Sanction  
Issues] (noting the problems resulting from overly broad preservation obligations and  
inconsistent standards for imposing sanctions across the country); see also Dallas  
Conference on Preservation/Sanctions (9/9/11), ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/Overview/DallasMiniConfSept20
11.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Dallas Conference] (providing a general 
description of the Dallas Conference and research submitted). 
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rules to address the preservation of ESI and sanctions for its spoliation in civil 
cases.7   
Currently, the trial judge has discretion to issue sanctions for spoliation.8  
However, a 2004 survey of federal and state court rulings regarding spoliation 
of ESI revealed that courts determined sanctions largely based on the alleged 
spoliator’s level of culpability and the degree of prejudice suffered by the 
innocent party.9  One of the more commonly issued sanctions for spoliation is 
an adverse-inference instruction.10  Although it is not the harshest sanction in a 
court’s arsenal, an adverse-inference instruction is nonetheless severe enough 
to end a lawsuit.11   
Two 2010 spoliation decisions—Pension Committee of University of 
Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC12 and Rimkus 
Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata13—exemplify the split between the 
Second and Fifth Circuits, among others.  The decisions highlight the circuits’ 
differing opinions on two issues: (1) the allocation of the burden to prove 
relevance and prejudice in spoliation cases and (2) the level of culpability 
required for an adverse-inference instruction or sanctions of similar severity.14  
The decisions also illustrate the varying approaches to the respective roles of 
the judge and the jury in administering the adverse-inference instruction.15 
These issues serve as an appropriate backdrop for a discussion on the 
usefulness of Connor v. Sun Trust Bank16 as a pedagogical tool.17  In Connor, 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ordered an  
                                           
 7. Memorandum on Report of Civil Rules Advisory Comm. from the Honorable David G. 
Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to the Honorable Mark R. 
Kravitz, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 2–6 (Dec. 2, 2011), available 
at http://ww.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/reports/CV12-2011.pdf [hereinafter 
Dec. 2 Memo] (discussing the Discovery Subcommittee’s evaluation of possible rules regarding 
preservation). 
 8. See supra note 3. 
 9. Scheindlin & Wangkeo, supra note 3, at 80. 
 10. See supra note 5.  A court imposing an adverse-inference instruction for a party’s failure 
to produce relevant evidence within its control will “instruct the jury that it may infer that the 
missing evidence is unfavorable to the party who could have produced the evidence and did not.”  
SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 422. 
 11. See infra Part IV.  The most severe sanction for spoliation is a default judgment for the 
plaintiff or, if the plaintiff is the spoliator, a dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims.  ADAM I. COHEN 
& DAVID J. LENDER, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.08[D][4] (Supp. 2011). 
 12. 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 13. 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 14. See infra Part IV.A.  Judges Shira A. Scheindlin and Lee H. Rosenthal, who, 
respectively, decided Pension Committee and Rimkus, are widely known e-discovery experts.  See 
infra Part I. 
 15. See infra Part IV.A. 
 16. 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2008).  The Honorable Robert L. Vining, Jr., senior 
district judge, wrote the opinion.  Id. at 1364. 
 17. See infra Part IV.B. 
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adverse-inference instruction as a sanction for the defendant’s bad-faith 
destruction of e-mail in an employment-discrimination action brought under 
the Family and Medical Leave Act.18  Connor is useful pedagogically because 
the facts raise several recurring issues regarding the alleged spoliations of ESI, 
including: (1) when a duty to preserve evidence arises, (2) the degree of 
culpability required to support a violation, (3) the standard of proof an innocent 
party must satisfy in order to establish relevance and prejudice, (4) the court’s 
discretion in finding spoliation and selecting an appropriate penalty, and (5) 
the uncertain protection from sanctions afforded by the safe-harbor provision 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e).19 
This Article discusses the unique issues involving ESI’s spoliation and the 
sanctions that may be issued as a consequence, exemplified by the Connor 
opinion.  Part I reviews the advent of evidentiary rules regarding ESI and goes 
on to explain this Article’s chosen focus of examining e-discovery through the 
lens of a particular classroom experience with the casebook entitled Electronic 
Discovery and Digital Evidence (the Casebook).20  In Part II, this Article 
highlights the challenges that arise when ESI is involved in the discovery 
process.  Part III explores the primary factors that courts use when considering 
whether to issue sanctions for evidence spoliation.  Part IV then discusses the 
adverse-inference instruction—a serious sanction that courts often impose.  
Next, the Article uses the Pension Committee and Rimkus decisions to examine 
the circuit split on certain spoliation issues and continues with an analysis of 
the pedagogical utility of Connor.  Finally, in Part V, this Article summarizes 
the recent meetings of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, in which the 
Committee has proposed rules that would govern sanctions for ESI spoliation. 
                                           
 18. Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1365–68, 1375–77; see also Family and Medical Leave Act 
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2006 & 
Supp. IV 2010) and in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 5 U.S.C.). 
 19. See infra Part IV.B.1–3.  Rule 37(e) provides that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a 
court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically 
stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information 
system.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 20. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1.  I taught Chapter IV of the Casebook, Spoliation and 
Sanctions, as part of a course in complex litigation at Texas Tech University School of Law.  See 
id. at 362–442.  In seven class periods, my class of nine very capable law students discussed the 
principal cases and commentaries in the chapter.  Each student was responsible for leading 
discussion on one of the principal cases after drafting a memorandum outlining his or her 
preparation.  Class members responded by e-mail each day to three questions concerning various 
aspects of the assigned case: (1) the effectiveness of the case in learning about the law governing 
sanctions for spoliation, (2) the difficult aspects of the case, and (3) the helpful aspects of the 
case. 
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I.  CHOOSING THE CHAPTER ON SPOLIATION AND SANCTIONS FOR CLASSROOM 
USE 
Many law students, as future litigators, need to ensure they avoid spoliation 
and its serious consequences.  The Casebook’s chapter on spoliation and 
sanctions was chosen because it effectively introduces students to the world of 
e-discovery.21  It also allows students to realize that, although one does not 
need to be a computer-science expert, practitioners should have a working 
knowledge of a party’s computer operations in order to adequately address 
potential issues regarding ESI spoliation. 
Two distinguished e-discovery experts authored the Casebook.  Professor 
Daniel Capra is the reporter to the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules and 
was the primary drafter of Rule 502 on waiver of privilege.22  He is also the  
co-author of a five-volume treatise on evidence.23   
Judge Scheindlin served from 1998 to 2005 on the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules and the Discovery Subcommittee that drafted the 2006 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which focused on  
e-discovery.24  The new rules recognized the shift from paper to digital records 
and specifically addressed ESI in the discovery process.25  Judge Scheindlin 
also wrote the series of landmark opinions in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 
in which she took an approach to e-discovery broadly consistent with the 
approach later taken by the Advisory Committee in the amended rules.26 
In addition to the Zubulake opinions, Judge Scheindlin authored the 2010 
opinion in Pension Committee, which she subtitled Zubulake Revisited: Six 
Years Later.27  In it, she summarized much of the law relating to “litigation 
                                           
 21. Id. at 362. 
 22. Id. at vi. 
 23. See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 
(10th ed. 2011). 
 24. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at vi. 
 25. See id. at 5–8. 
 26. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. 
UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg 
LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  For example, in Zubulake IV, Judge 
Scheindlin maintained that determining whether a “litigation hold” on a party’s routine 
document-destruction policy applies to certain ESI depends on the accessibility of that ESI.  
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218.  In general, accessible data is stored in a readily usable format 
and does not require restoration, whereas inaccessible data is not readily usable.  Zubulake I, 217 
F.R.D. at 320.  The amended rules applied the concept of accessibility when determining whether 
ESI is discoverable.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).  Under Rule 26(b), ESI is presumptively 
discoverable but a party can withhold ESI if it is not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden and cost.  See id. 26(b).  To obtain data that is not reasonably accessible, the requesting 
party must show good cause.  Id. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 27. Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Secs., LLC, 685 F. 
Supp. 2d 456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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holds” and sanctioned several plaintiffs with an adverse-inference instruction 
for grossly negligent collection and preservation of ESI.28  The decision is 
significant because it provides a legal framework for determining the 
appropriateness of sanctions for unintentional acts of spoliation.29  Further, it 
furnishes a series of examples of discovery misconduct, which may constitute 
either ordinary or gross negligence in a party’s implementation of a litigation 
hold.30 
The Casebook was so much the product of collaborative effort that the 
editors designated the Sedona Conference (Sedona) as a third  
co-author.31  Sedona is a law and policy institute comprised of leading judges, 
lawyers, academics, and technology consultants who are extremely 
knowledgeable on matters involving e-discovery.32  Through its development 
of a set of widely cited e-discovery publications,33 Sedona has been a primary 
source of guidance for judges, counsel, and clients facing novel issues in this 
area. 
                                           
 28. Id. at 465–66, 496–97.  The litigation hold, a communication suspending the routine 
policy for document maintenance and destruction when a duty to preserve evidence has arisen, 
applies to those persons likely to have relevant information.  THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE 
SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 30 
(2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY]; see also Cache La Poudre Feeds, 
LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 629–30 (D. Colo. 2007) (describing the duty 
requirement accompanying litigation holds).  The decision in Cache La Poudre Feeds LLC v. 
Land O’Lakes, Inc. noted that instituting a litigation hold is only the first step in the discovery 
process.  244 F.R.D. at 630.  A party must also conduct a reasonable search for responsive 
documents.  Id. at 630 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(2)).  In Cache La Poudre Feeds, the defendant 
issued a litigation hold, but later failed to prevent its employees from erasing the hard drives of 
former employees.  Id. at 629–30.  The court imposed a monetary sanction, reasoning that “[a] 
‘litigation hold,’ without more, will not suffice to satisfy the ‘reasonable inquiry’ requirement in 
Rule 26(g)(2).  Counsel retains an on-going responsibility to take appropriate measures to ensure 
that the client has provided all available information and documents which are responsive to 
discovery requests.”  Id. at 630 (citing Sexton v. United States, No. 6:99CV102ORL3ABI22, 
2001 WL 649445 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2001)). 
 29. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 463–72. 
 30. See id. at 479–96. 
 31. See generally  SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1. 
 32. Id. at iv. 
 33. The Sedona Conference Working Group on Electronic Document Retention & 
Production was formed in 2002 to examine whether the rules and concepts related to paper 
discovery would be adequate to address issues posed by e-discovery. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, 
SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING 
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION xi (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter SEDONA BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATIONS].  Sedona has produced many publications that are frequently cited in the 
area of e-discovery, including: SEDONA BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS, supra; SEDONA 
CONFERENCE GLOSSARY, supra note 28; THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: 
BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION AND RECORDS IN 
THE ELECTRONIC AGE (Public Comment Draft 2004); and Working Grp. I, The Sedona 
Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on Legal Holds: The Trigger & The Process, 
11 SEDONA CONF. J. 265 (2010). 
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The Casebook begins with a dazzling introduction by Professor Marcus, a 
primary drafter of the newly amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.34  
Professor Marcus provides an overview of the evolution of e-discovery and 
describes the momentous changes in American discovery practices over the 
past quarter-century, referring particularly to rulemaking efforts to contain 
overbroad discovery and, most recently, to explicitly address ESI.35  In doing 
so, he explains why e-discovery deserves separate attention in the rules.36  
Although the Casebook focuses almost entirely on federal e-discovery rules, 
Professor Marcus notes that ESI issues also arise in state courts, many of 
which have adopted e-discovery rules modeled after the federal rules.37 
Today’s law students, knowledgeable in the use of computers, will be 
buoyed by Professor Marcus’s remark that, as “products of the first digital 
generation,” they may be better equipped as future lawyers and judges to deal 
with ESI than present-day lawyers.38  For those who are less technologically 
savvy, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26(f) provides an important 
cautionary message.39  The Note warns that lawyers must develop an 
understanding of their clients’ computer systems in order to effectively 
perform their duties under the new rules.40 
For example, Rule 26(f) requires counsel to confer to address issues relating 
to the preservation of discoverable information and the form in which any ESI 
should be produced.41  Additionally, a lawyer must monitor his or her client’s 
                                           
 34. Marcus, supra note 1, at 1 n.1. 
 35. Id. at 1–15. 
 36. Id. at 5–13. 
 37. Id. at 13.  As of March 15, 2012, thirty states have adopted the federal approach in 
whole or in part.  David Canfield, An Overview of State E-Discovery Rules, INSIDE COUNSEL 
(Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/03/15/an-overview-of -state-e-discovery-
rules (citing Thomas Y. Allman, E-Discovery in Federal and State Courts after the 2006 Federal 




 38. Marcus, supra note 1, at 13. 
 39. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 26(f).  Throughout the Casebook, the authors pose challenging questions to illustrate 
various e-discovery issues.  In particular, the authors pose a series of questions relating to what 
one might do if his or her opponent is not prepared to discuss ESI problems at the pretrial 
conference: 
If your adversary does not place a sufficient level of importance on electronic 
discovery, how might you nonetheless sufficiently prepare for the Rule 16 pretrial 
conference?  Should you be prepared to discuss your client’s systems even though your 
adversary has not requested information about them?  How might you document your 
efforts, and your adversary’s disinterest, to protect you and your client should 
electronic discovery problems arise in the future? . . . If parties fail to adequately 
address electronic discovery issues during the Rule 26(f) meet and confer, and as a 
result, fail to identify to the court during the Rule 16 pretrial conference any anticipated 
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retention and production of electronic documents to ensure compliance with 
the rules.42  To perform these duties, counsel must consult the “key players” 
with access to the ESI to learn how the client stores e-data, the client’s 
information technology (IT) staff to understand the client’s IT infrastructure 
and policies, and possibly outside computer experts for general assistance.43  A 
cottage industry of electronic consultants has emerged to assist lawyers and 
parties in meeting their e-discovery obligations.44  This industry generates 
billions of dollars annually, demonstrating the cost, complexity, and 
prevalence of e-discovery in American litigation.45 
II.  THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICAN DISCOVERY IN A DIGITAL ERA 
Law students should be eager to study e-discovery.  The Advisory 
Committee explained that the sheer volume of ESI required new rules to 
govern its preservation and production.46  Electronic information is now the 
dominant form of business information, in part, because the costs of storing 
electronic data are far less than storing a comparable amount of paper 
records.47  Questions arise about the appropriate storage media, length of 
retention, procedures for retrieval, extent of discoverability, and production 
format.48 
The Committee noted that electronic data is dynamic, unlike paper 
documents, because its content may change with or without human 
intervention.49  Simply opening a document can alter earlier information.50  
                                                                                                 
electronic discovery issues, should they be precluded from raising any later identified 
electronic discovery problems as the basis for a discovery motion? 
SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 199. 
 42. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 85. 
 43. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 44. See Lauren Katz, A Balancing Act: Ethical Dilemmas in Retaining E-Discovery 
Consultants, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 929, 929–30 (2009) (describing the rapid development of 
e-discovery services once courts began ruling on ESI issues). 
 45. Marcus, supra note 1, at 1.  Law firms and other companies spent an estimated $2.7 
billion on e-discovery services in 2007.  Jonathan Hill, The Lure of India, L. TECH. NEWS, Oct. 1, 
2008, at 26 (reporting in 2008 that industry revenues were expected to reach $4.6 billion in 2010).  
In March 2011, the New York Times reported that e-discovery software utilizing artificial 
intelligence can review documents more quickly and at lower costs than lawyers and paralegals.  
John Markhoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
5, 2011, at A1. 
 46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (noting that “[t]he volume and 
dynamic nature of electronically stored information may complicate preservation obligations”). 
 47. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 nn.5–6 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 48. Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation, FED. CTS. 
L. REV., Oct. 2000, at 2. 
 49. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 50. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC 
INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 23 (2007), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt.pdf/$file/eldscpkt.pdf. 
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Additionally, deleting ESI is more difficult than paper documents because 
deletion does not physically remove the information from a hard drive.51  
Rather, deletion frees up the space for other uses, but the deleted data may be 
retrievable if it has not been overwritten or otherwise wiped from the hard 
drive.52  Deleted data could also be found on network backup tapes, which are 
used generally for disaster recovery.53  Restoration of such tapes can be 
difficult and costly, however, because the information is often difficult to 
access and tapes are recycled periodically, resulting in loss of data.54 
The Advisory Committee recognized the challenges attorneys faced under 
the old rules when reviewing ESI for privileged information.55  When 
producing discovery, a party must ensure that privileged communications are 
not disclosed in order to avoid waiver of privilege.56  Before the adoption of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 in 2008, an inadvertent disclosure of information 
could have resulted in a waiver of privilege even if the attorney took 
reasonable steps to prevent such a disclosure.57 Rule 502 clarified the matter by 
providing a uniform federal test for adjudicating claims of waiver through 
inadvertent production:  inadvertent disclosure will not waive privilege if the 
privilege holder took reasonable steps both to prevent disclosure and to rectify 
the error.58   
Before a party can review ESI for privileged information, the data must be 
located and retrieved—a process often complicated by multiple storage 
locations, high volume, and unhelpful records-management policies.59  After 
retrieval, the data may require restoration to be accessible, which can be a 
costly and time-consuming endeavor.60  Lawyers could benefit by enlisting  
e-discovery consultants to assist in the retrieval, restoration, and review 
processes.61  The associated costs can be enormous, however, when the matter 
involves vast amounts of ESI.62 
                                           
 51. See id. at 23 (defining “deleted data” and “deletion”). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 3. 
 54. Id. at 22 (defining “back up data” and “backup tape recycling”). 
 55. FED R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 56. Id.  (“A failure to withhold even one such item may result in an argument that there has 
been a waiver of privileged materials on that subject matter.”). 
 57. See FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note; see also Hopson v. Mayor & City 
Council of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 235–36 (D. Md. 2005) (noting that “there is no uniform 
position taken by the courts on whether inadvertent production waives privilege/work product 
protection”). 
 58. FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 59. Withers, supra note 48, at 3. 
 60. Id. at 5. 
 61. Katz, supra note 44, at 929–30. 
 62. Id. at 941. 
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In 2000, one commentator warned that e-discovery presents challenges 
distinct from paper-based discovery.63  First, e-discovery can include a greater 
volume of data.64  Second, ESI can be stored on a wide range of media, 
including employee laptops, desktops, home computers, network servers, and 
various hand-held devices.65  Having these varied storage locations disperses 
the data and complicates the discovery process, increasing costs and the risk  
of spoliation.66  Third, often outdated, underutilized, or nonexistent  
records-management practices of business organizations exacerbate discovery 
problems.67   Fourth, ESI is not always destroyed as regularly as paper records 
once the data are unnecessary.68  Consequently, the commingling of 
voluminous records often complicates the separation of potentially 
discoverable ESI from irrelevant records.69 
III.  THE MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF ESI SPOLIATION: CULPABILITY AND 
PREJUDICE 
A party seeking sanctions for spoliation must establish the following 
elements: 
(1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation 
to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were 
destroyed with a “culpable state of mind” and (3) that the destroyed 
evidence was “relevant” to the party’s claim or defense such that a 
reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or 
defense.70 
The Casebook authors distilled these elements into two primary  
factors—culpability and prejudicial effect—the degrees of which generally 
determine the type of sanctions imposed.71  Other factors include the extent to 
which the spoliation interfered with the judicial process, what sanction, if any, 
                                           
 63. Withers, supra note 48, at 2. 
 64. Id. at 2–3. 
 65. Id. at 3. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id.; see also Steven C. Bennett, Records Management: The Next Frontier in  
E-Discovery?, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 519, 521–22 (2009) (explaining that no major business has 
come close to reaching the “nirvana” of electronic-records management). 
 68. Withers, supra note 48, at 3. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Bernie v. Town of Cromwell, 
243 F.3d 93, 107–12 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 71. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 387.  Judge Scheindlin and her law clerk, 
Wangkeo, distilled these two factors from their study of state and federal sanctions decisions.  See 
Scheindlin & Wangkeo, supra note 3, at 76–77 (“When courts imposed sanctions, they referred to 
the willfulness or bad faith of the violator (49%), prejudice to the party requesting production 
(35%), and/or the gross negligence or recklessness of the spoliating party (9%) as the reason(s) 
for imposing the sanction(s).” (footnotes omitted)). 
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will remedy the spoliation and deter similar conduct, and whether to impose 
sanctions on an innocent party for spoliation committed by an attorney.72 
In selecting an appropriate sanction for litigants or counsel liable for 
spoliation, a judge may choose from a variety of sanctions—some more severe 
than others.73  In spite of these penalties, judges are hesitant to impose 
sanctions because they prefer that cases be decided on the merits.74  Further, 
when judges choose to order sanctions, they tend to avoid the most severe 
penalties.75 
The extent of culpability and prejudice varies.  Just as the wrongdoer’s 
conduct may range from inadvertent loss of evidence to intentional and  
bad-faith destruction, the prejudice suffered by the innocent party might be 
negligible or, quite conversely, could be dispositive.76  Additionally, courts 
will balance these factors against each other.77  For example, even if a party 
acted with a high degree of culpability, a court would be unlikely to impose 
sanctions if the consequent prejudice was negligible.78  Similarly, if a party 
suffered severe prejudice, but the destruction of evidence was completely 
inadvertent, the court would not likely impose sanctions because sanctioning 
requires at least some degree of culpability.79 
                                           
 72. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 387. 
 73. The spectrum of sanctions varies in severity. The least severe, monetary damages, allow 
a judge to order one party to pay the other for unnecessary discovery or to assess fines.  Panel 
Discussion, Sanctions in Electronic Discovery Cases: Views from the Judges, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1, 5–6 (2009) (remarks of the Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin, U.S. district judge).  More 
severe sanctions are those involving evidence, including “preclusion of evidence, . . . waiver of 
privilege or work-product protection, or . . . an adverse inference instruction.”  Id. at 6.  The most 
severe sanctions include entering default judgment and finding the attorney or party to be in 
contempt of court.  Id. 
 74. Id. at 11 (remarks of the Honorable Loretta A. Preska, U.S. district judge) (“First of all, 
the judicial system prefers to resolve controversies on the merits.  Secondly, most judges don’t 
like to sanction lawyers. Thirdly—and this is from a very selfish perspective—sanctions create a 
lot of extra work while not actually moving the ball toward the resolution of the case and, fourth, 
it is not unheard of for the Court of Appeals to reverse sanctions decisions.”). 
 75. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 387. 
 76. Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. Tex. 
2010).  In Rimkus, the destruction of e-mail had mixed effects for the wrongdoers (defendants) as 
well as the innocent party (plaintiff).  Id. at 607–08.  Although many of the e-mails that the 
defendants deleted were unrecoverable, some were retrieved from other sources.  Id. at 608.  Of 
those recovered, some were adverse to the defendants, but others were favorable to them.  Id.  
According to the court, the plaintiff was still able to obtain “extensive evidence” to support its 
claims and defenses despite the loss of the e-mails.  Id.  Balancing these competing factors, the 
court concluded that the reduced prejudice to the plaintiff justified an adverse-inference 
instruction rather than a more severe sanction, such as entering default judgment or modifying 
pleadings.  Id. 
 77. See id. at 613. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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A decision to impose sanctions can be particularly difficult in the context of 
e-discovery for at least two reasons.  First, whether the loss or destruction of 
ESI occurred during the routine management of records or at the direction of a 
specific individual can be difficult to determine.80  Second, restoring lost or 
destroyed ESI is often prohibitively expensive, further complicating the 
process of fashioning appropriate relief for spoliation victims.81   
IV.  THE ADVERSE-INFERENCE INSTRUCTION 
The judge alone decides whether to impose spoliation sanctions of almost 
every type, but the adverse-inference instruction is an exception.82  Once the 
judge has decided to impose this particular sanction, the jury must decide 
whether a party is culpable for spoliation and whether the other party would 
have benefitted from the evidence so spoliated.83  Adverse-inference 
instructions are also distinct from other sanctions because the alleged spoliator 
may introduce evidence at trial to re-argue the spoliation issue.84  In some 
cases, the judge will determine culpability and permit the jury to presume 
prejudice, whereas in others, the judge will present both issues as questions of 
fact for the jury to decide.85  Regardless of whether a legal presumption exists 
and whether the judge or the jury finds spoliation, the jury decides whether to 
presume the evidence was adverse to the wrongdoer.86  
Unlike the most severe sanctions, such as default judgment and dismissal of 
claims or defenses, the adverse-inference instruction does not formally end 
litigation.  Nonetheless, courts properly describe it as an extreme sanction 
                                           
 80. COHEN & LENDER, supra note 11, § 3.08[D] (“The how, when, and why of spoliation of 
electronic evidence can be a complicated inquiry.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Panel Discussion, supra note 73, at 10 (remarks of the Honorable Shira A. 
Scheindlin, U.S. district judge) (“Unlike all the other sanctions, when a court issues an adverse 
inference instruction, the court’s finding of spoliation can be second-guessed by the jury.”). 
 83. Id. (“Although the court has already found that a party caused evidence to be lost and 
that a sanction is appropriate, the jury has to do it all over again.”). 
 84. See id. (quoting Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 203 (D.S.C. 2008)). 
 85. Compare Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 620 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010) (presenting both factors for the jury to decide), with Pension Comm. of Univ. of 
Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Secs., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 496–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(finding grossly negligent culpability and allowing the jury to presume prejudice). 
 86. Charles W. Adams, Spoliation of Electronic Evidence: Sanctions Versus Advocacy, 18 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2011) (providing an overview of the  
adverse-inference instruction and an analysis of Pension Committee and Rimkus). Professor 
Charles Adams argued that adverse-inference instructions are undesirable because they are costly, 
time consuming, contentious, and require redundant fact-finding by both the judge and jury.  Id. 
at 47–48.  He recommended that courts instead allow parties to offer evidence of spoliation at 
trial and then argue inferences that should be drawn.  Id. at 48. 
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because in practice a decision to issue such an instruction often results in 
settlement before the jury is so instructed.87 
Although often referred to simply as an adverse-inference instruction, this 
sanction may take the form, depending on the jurisdiction, of either an 
inference or a presumption of the existence of key elements of spoliation.88  
Consequently, how the judge frames the instruction can significantly influence 
the severity of the sanction.  An adverse-inference instruction is itself a severe 
sanction, but instructions on presumptions of spoliation can have an even 
greater effect on the jury for two reasons.  First, presumptions operate to shift 
the burden of producing evidence on such issues as relevance and prejudice to 
the wrongdoer.89  Second, an unopposed presumption, at least in theory, 
controls the jury’s decision.90  Regardless of the instruction, the offending 
party may introduce evidence at trial to rebut the elements of spoliation so that 
the jury has adequate information on which to decide if an inference or 
presumption is ultimately appropriate.91 
A.  Two District Court Decisions Granting an Adverse-Inference Instruction 
The opinions in Pension Committee and Rimkus illustrate varying 
approaches that courts might take when addressing the three issues 
surrounding an adverse-inference instruction.92  First, the courts disagreed on 
the level of culpability required for an adverse-inference instruction.93  Second, 
                                           
 87. See Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that “an adverse 
inference instruction often ends litigation” and “the party suffering the instruction will be  
hard-pressed to prevail on the merits”); see also Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 619–20 (“Although 
adverse inference instructions can take varying forms that range in harshness, and although all 
such instructions are less harsh than so-called terminating sanctions, they are properly viewed as 
among the most severe sanctions a court can administer.”). 
 88. Compare Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (stating that the jury may infer prejudice), with 
Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 496–97 (instructing the jury that it may presume prejudice 
and then determine whether the presumption was sufficiently rebutted). 
 89. Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (citing Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467–68). 
 90. 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 3.6 (3d 
ed. 2007). 
 91. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 750 (8th Cir. 2004); cf. Rimkus, 688 F. 
Supp. 2d at 617 (describing in both inference and presumption cases how the instruction could be 
rebutted). 
 92. See supra note 88. 
 93. Pension Committee and Rimkus reflect the sharp split of authority between the Second 
Circuit, in which negligence can warrant an adverse-inference instruction, and the Fifth Circuit 
and others, in which bad faith is required.  Compare Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 496–97 
(granting an adverse-inference instruction when the offenders’ conduct was grossly negligent), 
with Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 614 (noting that severe sanctions such as an adverse-inference 
instruction will not be imposed in the Fifth Circuit without a showing of bad faith).  Courts 
following Pension Committee in the Second Circuit reason that each party should bear the risk of 
its own carelessness.  See Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (describing the Pension Committee 
opinion and its application of Second Circuit case law).  Magistrate Judge James C. Francis, IV, 
explained that the rationale for this approach is not to punish the spoliator for carelessness but to 
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the courts have different views on whether the innocent party must prove that 
the missing evidence has prejudiced its claims or defenses.94  Third, the courts 
view the functions of the judge and jury in administering the adverse-inference 
instruction differently.95   
1. Pension Committee: Presuming Relevance and Prejudice when a Party Is 
Grossly Negligent 
In Pension Committee, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York found gross and ordinary negligence in the offenders’ conduct 
during discovery, but found no intentional misconduct.96  The court 
acknowledged that determining the level of culpability in hindsight is not an 
exact science and different judges could make different determinations.97   
The court found that failing to issue a timely litigation hold in writing, 
failing to collect or reserve any ESI three years into litigation, continuing to 
delete ESI after the duty to preserve arose, failing to request documents from 
key players, failing to supervise search efforts, destroying potentially relevant 
backup data, and submitting misleading information all constituted gross 
negligence.98  It also stressed that a party must institute a litigation hold to 
suspend routine document-destruction policies and to preserve relevant 
documentation once that party reasonably anticipates litigation.99  The court 
further explained that failure to issue such a hold in writing is grossly negligent 
conduct because relevant information will likely be destroyed in its absence.100   
                                                                                                 
remedy the imbalance the loss of evidence has caused.  Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 
F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The inference is adverse to the destroyer not because of any 
finding of moral culpability, but because the risk that the evidence would have been detrimental 
rather than favorable should fall on the party responsible for its loss.” (emphasis in original)). 
 94. Compare Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (permitting the court to presume 
prejudice when the offender acted in bad faith or a grossly negligent manner), with Rimkus, 688 
F. Supp. 2d at 617–18 (suggesting disagreement with Pension Committee and that the innocent 
party must make some showing of prejudice regardless of the offender’s culpability). 
 95. Compare Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 496 n.251 (explaining that although the 
jury is bound by the court’s finding that the plaintiffs destroyed documents, the jury must 
determine “whether that evidence is relevant or whether its loss has caused any prejudice”), with 
Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (allowing the jury to hear evidence about the loss of e-mails, and 
instructing the jury that if it finds the defendants intentionally deleted e-mails for purposes of 
litigation, it may infer that the e-mails would have been adverse to defendants). 
 96. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 479, 488.  A group of ninety-six investors brought 
state and federal securities claims against former directors, fund administrators, and auditors to 
recover losses from the liquidation of two offshore hedge funds that were alleged to exceed $550 
million.  Id. at 462 & n.3.  After the start of discovery, the defendants complained of gaps in the 
plaintiffs’ document responses and moved for sanctions.  Id. at 462–63. 
 97. Id. at 463. 
 98. Id. at 479. 
 99. Id. at 466 (quoting Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 249 F.R.D. 111, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
 100. Id. at 465. 
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As a result of this gross negligence, the court gave the jury an  
adverse-inference instruction and permitted it to presume prejudice.101 
The Pension Committee court offered examples of conduct that might 
constitute ordinary negligence, such as failing to take appropriate ESI 
preservation measures, failing to assess search terms for accuracy and validity, 
and failing to gather information from each employee relevant to the 
litigation.102  The court did not impose an adverse-inference instruction on the 
parties that it found merely negligent.103  Rather, it sanctioned those parties 
with lesser penalties such as costs and attorneys fees.104 
According to the court, the severity of the adverse-inference instruction 
should depend on the spoliator’s level of culpability.105  Courts can set the 
level of security by controlling the jury’s discretion with presumptions.106  
When the offender’s conduct is most egregious through willful behavior or bad 
faith, the judge can instruct the jury that it must accept certain facts as true.107  
When the conduct is less egregious, but still willful or reckless, the judge can 
issue a mandatory presumption, which may be rebutted.108  In the least 
egregious cases warranting an adverse-inference instruction, in which the 
offender acted negligently, the judge can instruct the jury that it may presume 
prejudice, which can then be rebutted.109  These presumptions shift the burden 
to the offender to prove that the spoliated evidence is not relevant and that its 
loss does not prejudice the innocent party.110  The court explained that 
excusing innocent parties entirely from the burden establishing evidentiary 
prejudice would incentivize parties to challenge even inadvertent errors, 
resulting in “a ‘gotcha’ game rather than a full and fair opportunity to air the 
merits of a dispute.”111 
                                           
 101. Id. at 496–97. 
 102. Id. at 465. 
 103. Id. at 497. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 470. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  The Pension Committee court distinguished between the judge’s decision to impose 
an instruction and the jury’s decision to apply the inference when the conduct was merely 
negligent.  Compare id. at 467–68 (stating that the innocent party must prove relevance and 
prejudice for a judge to impose an adverse-inference instruction for merely negligent conduct), 
with id. at 470–71 (explaining that, after the judge decides to impose an instruction, the least 
harsh instruction involves a permissible presumption). 
 110. Id. at 468–89. 
 111. Id. at 468. 
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2. Rimkus: An Adverse-Inference Instruction Requires a Showing of 
Relevance 
In Rimkus, Judge Lee Rosenthal ordered an adverse-inference instruction to 
remedy the spoliator’s allegedly intentional destruction of ESI.112  She noted 
that the circuit split on the required level of culpability limited the usefulness 
of Pension Committee in which Judge Scheindlin permitted an  
adverse-inference instruction for gross negligence.113  For example, the Fifth 
Circuit has held that mere negligence is insufficient for an adverse-inference 
instruction because evidence of bad faith is required.114  Additionally, Judge 
Rosenthal observed that the Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits 
similarly have held that negligence alone is insufficient for the penalty.115  
Whereas Judge Scheindlin in Pension Committee permitted the court to 
presume relevance and prejudice when the offender acted with gross 
negligence or bad faith, Judge Rosenthal suggested in Rimkus that an  
adverse-inference instruction is not proper in the Fifth Circuit absent a showing 
that the spoliated evidence would at least be relevant.116   
                                           
 112. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 646 (S.D. Tex. 
2010).  Several forensic engineers left the Rimkus Consulting Group to start a competing 
company.  Id. at 621–22.  These former employees filed a preemptive suit against Rimkus in 
Louisiana state court seeking to nullify certain noncompetition agreements in their employment 
contracts.  Id. at 641.  In a responsive suit in a federal court in Texas, plaintiff Rimkus alleged 
that, in forming a new company, these departing employees violated the terms of their 
employment contracts and misappropriated confidential and proprietary information.  Id. at 624, 
628.  Unlike the negligent conduct in Pension Committee, the spoliation in Rimkus allegedly 
consisted of willful misconduct.  Id. at 611.  While the suit was pending in state court, the 
offenders allegedly deleted e-mails and attachments to prevent them from being used in an 
anticipated lawsuit.  Id. at 607–08. 
 113. Id. at 615. 
 114. Id. at 614 (citing Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 2005); 
King v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 337 F.3d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 
156 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
 115. Id. at 614 nn.10–11 (citing Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1149 (10th 
Cir. 2009); Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 644 (7th Cir. 2008); Greyhound Lines, 
Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007); Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 
318 F.3d 1284, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); Wyler v. Korean Air Lines Co., 928 F.2d 1167, 1174 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991)).  Judge Rosenthal also noted “[t]he First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits hold that bad 
faith is not essential to imposing severe penalties if there is severe prejudice, although the cases 
often emphasize the presence of bad faith.  In the Third Circuit, the courts balance the degree of 
fault and prejudice.”  Id. at 614–15 (footnotes omitted).  The Casebook discusses these conflicting 
positions on the degree of culpability required to warrant sanctions for spoliation.  SCHEINDLIN 
ET AL., supra note 1, at 387–88.  For example, in the First Circuit, the spoliation finding is left to 
the finder of fact and no level of culpability is required to obtain an adverse-inference instruction.  
Id. at 388 (quoting Testa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 173, 177 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
 116. Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (citing Condrey, 431 F.3d at 203 n.8; Escobar v. City of 
Hous., No. 04–1945, 2007 WL 2900581, at *17–18 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2007)).  Judge Rosenthal 
further noted that the issue of whether there should be a presumption of relevance or prejudice 
was not before the court in Rimkus because the record contained evidence of the spoliated ESI’s 
contents.  Id. at 617–18. 
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The Rimkus court instructed the jury that, as a matter of law, the defendants 
had a duty to preserve certain ESI, which, unlike Pension Committee, allowed 
the jury to decide culpability.117  This instruction was less severe than in 
Pension Committee because the jury was free to decide whether in fact the 
alleged offenders deleted ESI to prevent its use in anticipated litigation.118  
Under the Rimkus approach, the court only decides whether the evidence is 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find intentional destruction.119  Thereafter, 
upon hearing all the evidence, the jury would be so instructed to decide 
whether the alleged offenders intentionally destroyed the evidence.120  Further, 
the instruction directed that if the jury found intent, it could, but was not 
required to, infer that the missing ESI would have been detrimental to the 
offenders.121  Judge Rosenthal noted that jury instructions based on 
presumptions and burden-shifting analyses (as in Pension Committee) are 
unnecessary and confusing.122 
Judge Rosenthal suggested that the principle of proportionality endorsed by 
the Sedona Conference should guide courts considering sanctions.  The Sedona 
Conference suggested that “[e]lectronic discovery burdens should be 
proportional to the amount in controversy and the nature of the case.  
Otherwise, transaction costs due to electronic discovery will overwhelm the 
ability to resolve disputes fairly in litigation.”123  Judge Rosenthal also noted 
that the reasonableness of discovery efforts in Pension Committee—a $550 
million case—is different than the reasonableness of discovery efforts in 
Rimkus, which involved a dispute over noncompetition agreements.124  In 
short, the reasonableness of discovery efforts turns on whether those efforts 
were proportional to the facts and circumstances of the case and whether they 
were consistent with applicable standards.125 
                                           
 117. Compare id. at 646, with Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of 
Am. Secs., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 118. Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 646. 
 119. Id. at 644. 
 120. Id. at 646–47. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 620 & n.21 (quoting Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 576 (5th 
Cir. 2004); Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 964 F2d 1471, 1478 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
 123. Id. at 613 & n.8 (quoting SEDONA BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 
33, at 17). 
 124. Id. at 613 n.9. 
 125. Id. at 613.  In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., the Supreme Court explained that federal 
courts have inherent power to punish bad-faith conduct.  501 U.S. 32, 49–50 (1991).  Judge 
Rosenthal concluded that the alleged spoliation in Rimkus implicated the court’s inherent 
authority.  Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 612.  She consequently cautioned that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Chambers might require the courts to find more than negligent culpability in order to 
issue sanctions based on their inherent power.  Id. at 615. 
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B.  The Casebook Example: Connor v. Sun Trust Bank 
In Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, Maria Connor, a former communications 
manager of defendant Sun Trust Bank, alleged that the bank violated the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by firing her for taking two months of 
FMLA leave after she adopted a child.126  Before taking leave, the bank 
reassigned two of the eight employees that she managed.127  Although she was 
based in Atlanta, three of the employees she managed worked in the Enterprise 
Publication Services (EPS) group in Orlando.128  While Connor was on leave, 
one of the three in Orlando (the EPS on-site supervisor) resigned 
unexpectedly.129  Connor’s supervisor, Leslie Weigel, then initiated 
discussions with senior management, which led the bank to reassign the two 
remaining EPS employees to another Sun Trust department in Orlando.130  
Consequently, when the plaintiff returned in 2007, she supervised only three 
employees based on Atlanta.131 
Less than a month after returning, Weigel informed the plaintiff that her 
employment was being terminated.132  About two weeks later, on February 12, 
2007, Weigel sent an e-mail to the bank’s senior management team explaining 
that the decision to fire the plaintiff was based on the reduction in employees 
that she managed.133 
                                           
 126. 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1364–65 (N.D. Ga. 2008).  This Article’s discussion of the facts 
in Connor is based on events described in the court’s  
opinion—not on a reading of the underlying record. 
 127. Id. at 1365. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  Connor alleged that her former employer’s interference with her FMLA rights and 
retaliation for engaging in protected activity violated the FMLA.  Id. at 1364.  She asserted that 
the resignation of the on-site EPS supervisor in Orlando created a “supervision gap,” which she 
would have filled had she not been on leave.  Id. at 1366.  She alleged that by reducing her job 
responsibilities and removing all but three of her direct subordinates, Sun Trust failed to restore 
her to the same position or an equivalent upon her return.  Id. at 1369–70; see also 29 U.S.C.  
§ 2614(a)(1) (2006) (requiring employers to restore employees to the same or an equivalent 
position).  Sun Trust argued that it was not obligated to restore Connor to her former position 
because it had eliminated the position as a result of a legitimate reorganization and terminated her 
for reasons unrelated to her FMLA leave.  Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1366; see also, e.g., 
O’Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1353–54 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming 
the district court’s finding that the defendant was justified in firing the plaintiff because defendant 
proved that plaintiff would have been discharged regardless of her FMLA leave); Rice v. Sunrise 
Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that the employee retains the burden of 
proving that he or she is entitled to his or her prior employment position); Sylvester v. Dead River 
Co., 260 F. Supp. 2d 181, 187 (D. Me. 2003) (finding for the employer because the employee 
failed to counter the employer’s evidence that he would have been in the same position had he not 
been on leave). 
 131. Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1365–66. 
 132. Id. at 1365. 
 133. Id. at 1366. 
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Connor then employed an attorney who, before filing suit, sent Sun Trust a 
letter on February 21, 2007, informing the bank of the potential for litigation 
and requesting that the bank preserve documents relevant to Connor’s 
termination.134  On February 22, the bank’s in-house counsel issued 
preservation instructions to several employees, including Weigel, who were 
likely to possess potentially relevant information.135  These employees gave the 
plaintiff responsive documents, but did not provide the February 12 e-mail.136  
In September of 2007, Connor obtained a copy of the e-mail by undisclosed 
means.137  She contended that the e-mail supported her theory of an FMLA 
violation and moved, before trial, to sanction the bank for not producing it.138  
The court found that the bank’s failure constituted bad-faith spoliation of 
evidence and sanctioned the bank with an “appropriate” inference instruction 
because the spoliation prejudiced the plaintiff.139  Unfortunately, the Connor 
court did not discuss the form or content of its intended inference 
instruction.140 
Sun Trust’s e-mail retention system required employees to take overt action 
to preserve e-mails.141  The bank’s server retained an e-mail for thirty days, 
after which it would be deleted automatically unless the employee had 
archived or deleted it previously.142  Additionally, the bank backed up all  
e-mails on a daily basis for disaster-recovery purposes, but these backups were 
recycled every seven to ten days.143  Thus, on February 21, when the bank 
received notice of potential litigation, the February 12 e-mail would have 
remained on the server for about twenty more days and an additional seven to 
ten days thereafter on the backup tapes, unless someone affirmatively deleted it 
beforehand.144 
                                           
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1367. 
 136. Id. at 1368. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. at 1364, 1366. 
 139. Id. at 1366–67. 
 140. See id. at 1377.  Connor was disposed of without trial.  Stipulation of Dismissal with 
Prejudice at 1, Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (No. 1:07-CV-0650-RLV).  Several of my class 
members said that they were somewhat confused when the opinion referred at one point to 
instructing on a “presumption” of spoliation and at another to instructing on an “inference” of 
spoliation.  See Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1377.  This reaction to the court’s unexplained 
reference to both terms in its opinion is understandable.  Law students know the differences 
between inferences and presumptions, but they likely are unfamiliar with cases like Pension 
Committee or Rimkus which show that inference instructions can take various forms and may 
refer to either or both of these evidentiary devices. 
 141. Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1367. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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Weigel customarily archived her inbox and outbox on a weekly basis.145  
After she was instructed on February 22 to preserve relevant documents, she 
searched her archives and produced some e-mails, not including the e-mail 
from February 12.146  In September 2007, after Connor obtained this particular 
e-mail and moved for sanctions, Weigel checked her archives again to see if 
she had previously missed it.147  She discovered that she had not archived any 
e-mails between January 1 and February 18, 2007.148  Consequently, all her  
e-mails during that period were deleted automatically after thirty days on the 
server (unless Weigel had deleted it earlier).149  Sun Trust explained that 
Weigel’s departure from her usual practice was due to the press of business.150   
As one of the most frequent means of business communication, e-mail is a 
rich source of discoverable information.151  E-discovery experts have identified 
several qualities of e-mail communication that distinguish it from other forms 
of communication.152  Oftentimes, e-mails are not edited, proofread, or 
reviewed.153  Additionally, the sender may fail to understand that his or her 
statements are not private or secure and that his workplace statements may be 
attributed to his employer.154  Thus, a sender potentially may treat a subject 
less thoughtfully, more casually, and make statements in an e-mail that he or 
she would not in letters or memoranda.155  These generalizations, however, do 
not apply in every case.  For example, Weigel’s February 12 e-mail appears to 
be a business communication made with an appropriate and normal degree of 
care.156  
The Connor court, applying the five-factor test adopted in the Eleventh 
Circuit, found that Sun Trust acted in bad faith and spoliated evidence when its 
employee, Weigel, failed to preserve the February 12 e-mail.157  The first and 
                                           
 145. See id. at 1366–67. 
 146. Id. at 1367. 
 147. Id. at 1367–68. 
 148. Id. at 1368. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. at 1367. 
 151. See BRENT KIDWELL ET AL., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY § 7.01 (2010). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (quoting 
Weigel’s e-mail to Connor). 
 157. Id. at 1375–77.  The court considered the five factors set forth in Flury v. Daimler 
Chrysler Corp.: 
(1) whether the plaintiff was prejudiced as a result of the destruction of evidence; (2) 
whether the prejudice could be cured; (3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) 
whether the defendant acted in good or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse if the 
evidence was not excluded. 
Id. (citing Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 945 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
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fourth factors are the primary concerns for spoliation issues, as set forth in the 
Casebook.158  The first factor—prejudice—occurs when an innocent party 
would have relied on relevant evidence to prove its case but for the absence of 
that evidence due to its destruction.159  The court compared the direct, 
irrevocable prejudice in Flury with the more speculative prejudice at issue in 
Connor because the evidence in question was obtained eventually.160  
Although the court described the harm to Connor as “attenuated,” it still found 
that she was prejudiced because the defendant’s failure to produce or preserve 
the February 12 e-mail raised the concern that other relevant e-mails existed at 
the time, which similarly were not produced.161    
The court focused primarily on the fourth factor regarding the degree of 
culpability—whether Sun Trust acted in good or bad faith.162  For this 
determination, the court balanced the bank’s culpability against the prejudice 
to Connor, which are the primary factors of spoliation.163   Although there was 
                                           
 158. See SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 387 (explaining that the primary factors are 
prejudice and culpability).  With regard to the three remaining factors, the court found that the 
second and third factors pulled in opposite directions and the fifth factor’s potential for abuse was 
only slight.  See Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1376–77.  The contents of the February 12 e-mail 
had practical importance because it bore directly on the reasons for the plaintiff’s termination.  Id.  
The court found that the prejudice could be cured, but did not explain how.  Id.  In assessing the 
fifth factor, the court focused on whether the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to discover the 
most reliable and relevant evidence in support of her claims.  Id. at 1377.  It found a slight 
potential for abuse because of the possibility that the defendant withheld other e-mails relating to 
the reasons for Connor’s discharge.  Id.  Specifically, the court explained that the lack of other  
e-mails pertaining to Connor’s termination could support the bank’s case, and Connor did not 
have the ability to present conflicting evidence.  Id. 
 159. Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1376. 
 160. Id.  In Flury, a products-liability suit arising from the failure of an airbag to deploy, the 
plaintiff allowed the vehicle to be destroyed before the defendant could examine it.  Flury, 427 
F.3d at 940, 943.  As a result, the defendant was irreversibly prejudiced because the most critical 
physical evidence was unavailable.  Id. at 947. 
 161. Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1376. 
 162. Id. at 1376–77.  The Eleventh Circuit requires bad-faith conduct to support an  
adverse-inference instruction.  Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(“[A]n adverse inference is drawn from a party’s failure to preserve evidence only when the 
absence of that evidence is predicated on bad faith.” (quoting Bashir v. Amtrack, 119 F.3d 929, 
931 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam))).  Although malice is not required, mere negligence will not 
rise to the level of bad faith.  Id. (citing Bashir, 119 F.3d at 931).  In the Eleventh Circuit, the 
requisite culpability warranting an adverse-inference instruction involves some element of 
consciousness.  Bashir, 119 F.3d at 931.  The Casebook authors report that recent district court 
decisions in the Fourth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits share or lean toward the Second 
Circuit’s position that negligent conduct might warrant an adverse-inference instruction for 
spoliation.  SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 386–88.  For example, a 2008 district court 
decision in the Eleventh Circuit issued an adverse-inference instruction for negligent spoliation in 
the absence of bad faith.  Brown v. Chertoff, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1381 (S.D. Ga. 2008) 
(reasoning that bad faith is only one factor and courts, since Flury, now balance the degree of 
culpability with the degree of prejudice). 
 163. Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1376–77. 
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no direct evidence of Weigel’s intent, the court nevertheless found that she 
acted in bad faith because she knew the e-mail was relevant and either allowed 
it to be deleted automatically or affirmatively deleted it.164  The court 
concluded that the bank was at least “minimally culpable,” and combined with 
the prejudicial effect, rendered the bank sufficiently blameworthy to warrant 
imposition of an adverse-inference instruction.165   
1.  The Trigger Date: When the Duty to Preserve Arises 
When should Sun Trust have reasonably anticipated litigation, thus 
triggering the duty to preserve the February 12 e-mail?  At the latest, a  
firm-wide duty to preserve evidence attached on February 21, 2007, when 
Connor’s attorney advised Sun Trust of the likelihood of litigation and 
requested that relevant documents be preserved.166  The more difficult question 
is whether Sun Trust was subject to a duty to preserve the e-mail at the time it 
was sent or any time before receiving the demand letter.167  The court did not 
address this question explicitly.  Arguably, the bank’s duty to preserve 
evidence triggered only upon Connor’s attorney threatening suit on February 
21.168  The facts do not show that Connor indicated a potential suit before the 
demand letter.169   
Courts agree that the duty is triggered when litigation is reasonably 
anticipated, which may be before an action has commenced.170  The Sedona 
                                           
 164. Id.  Even if Weigel did not affirmatively delete the e-mail, it would have remained in 
her outbox for another twenty days from the day she was instructed to preserve information.  Id. 
 165. Id. at 1377.  The court also considered the actions of another employee, Sue Johnson, 
head of human resources, who received the February 12 e-mail but similarly did not produce it.  
Id. at 1368.  The court did not focus on Johnson’s actions in its spoliation analysis because of her 
custom to delete messages that did not require any further action on her part.  Id.  Assuming the  
e-mail required no response, had Johnson followed her usual practice, she would have deleted the 
e-mail immediately and it would not have been producible because the backup tapes would have 
been overwritten by the time of the preservation order.  Id.  The court may have found Johnson’s 
actions less culpable than Weigel’s because she was only a recipient of the e-mail, rather than its 
author, who supervised and decided to fire Connor.  Id. 
 166. Id. at 1366; see also Cache La Poudre Foods, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 
614, 623 (D. Colo. 2007) (explaining that a duty to preserve evidence before litigation occurs 
with an explicit and unequivocal demand letter); SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 107 
(“Properly crafted pre-litigation preservation letters can impose the duty of preservation.”). 
 167. The Connor court was unable determine the exact date that the February 12 e-mail was 
destroyed.  See Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1367–68.  The court speculated that Weigel may have 
deleted the e-mail before the end of the thirty-day retention period.  Id. at 1377. 
 168. W. Lawrence Westcott II, The Duty to Preserve Electronic Evidence: Connor v. Sun 
Trust Bank, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, Nov. 2009, at 8 (“This holding disregards 
precedent requiring some action by Connor indicating likelihood of suit before the duty to 
preserve can arise.”). 
 169. See id. at 3 (“[I]n virtually every case which has considered the issue, there has been at 
least some indication from the plaintiff that a suit was contemplated.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271. F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The duty 
to preserve evidence . . . extends to that period before the litigation when a party reasonably 
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Conference stated that “[r]easonable anticipation of litigation arises when an 
organization is on notice of a credible probability that it will become involved 
in litigation or seriously contemplates initiating litigation.”171  Determining 
when this duty arises depends on particular facts and circumstances.172 
Admittedly, expecting every terminated employee to sue his or her former 
employer is unreasonable.  Nonetheless, the discharge of employees soon after 
                                                                                                 
should know that the evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation.”); Lewy v. Remington 
Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988) (dictum) (noting that a company is required to 
preserve documents it knows or should have known would become material in the future); Doe v. 
Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 377 (D. Conn. 2007) (stating that a duty to preserve arises 
“when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.” (quoting 
Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2001))).  The Federal 
Circuit recently issued opinions in companion cases to reconcile inconsistent spoliation decisions 
in the District of Delaware and the Northern District of California. Compare Micron Tech., Inc. v. 
Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1319–26 (Fed. Cir. 2011), with Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. 
Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336, 1341, 1344–47 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  Rambus, a patent owner, had 
created a document-retention policy as part of its litigation strategy.  Micron Tech., Inc. v. 
Rambus Inc., 255 F.R.D. 135, 139–41 (D. Del. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 645 F.3d at 
1332.  Pursuant to the policy, Rambus destroyed numerous documents on two “shred” days.  Id. 
at 142, 145.  The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware found intentional spoliation and 
declared several of Rambus’s patents unenforceable because the duty to preserve arose when the 
offender decided to implement a litigation strategy.  Id. at 150–51.  On substantially similar facts, 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied Hynix declaratory relief, 
ruling that Rambus had not spoliated evidence because the destruction occurred before a duty to 
preserve arose.  Hynix, 645 F.3d at 1342–45.  In Micron, the Federal Circuit reversed the district 
court’s ruling as to the relief granted but affirmed its spoliation finding.  Micron, 645 F.3d at 
1332.  It stated that a trigger date depends on an “objective standard, asking not whether the party 
in fact reasonably foresaw litigation, but whether a reasonable party in the same factual 
circumstances would have reasonably foreseen litigation.”  Id.  In Hynix, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s spoliation finding, concluding that the lower court improperly 
required a finding of certain immediate litigation to trigger the preservation duty.  Hynix, 645 
F.3d at 1347.  The Federal Circuit expressly rejected any requirement of imminency before a duty 
to preserve arises.  Id. at 1345–46 (“It would be inequitable to allow a party to destroy documents 
it expects will be relevant in an expected future litigation, solely because contingencies exist, 
where the party destroying documents fully expects those contingencies to be resolved.”). 
 171. Working Grp. I, supra note 33, at 269. 
 172. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 104.  In its guidelines, Sedona described 
circumstances when the duty to preserve does not arise: 
For example, a vague rumor or indefinite threat of litigation does not trigger the duty; 
nor does a threat of litigation that is not deemed to be reasonable or made in good faith.  
A lack of credibility may arise from the nature of the threat itself or from past 
experience regarding the type of threat, the person who made the threat, the legal basis 
upon which the threat is purportedly founded, or any of a number of similar facts.  In 
addition, the trigger point for a small dispute, where the stakes are minor, might occur 
at a later point than for a dispute that is significant in terms of business risk or financial 
consequences.  A reasoned analysis of all of the available facts and circumstances is 
necessary to conclude whether litigation or a government inquiry is or is not 
“reasonably anticipated.”  That determination is and should be made by an experienced 
person who can make a reasoned judgment. 
Working Grp. I, supra note 33, at 272 (footnote omitted). 
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they return from engaging in protected activity involves a significantly greater 
risk of litigation than terminating employees who have not engaged in such 
activity.173  The risk of litigation is further heightened when the employee’s 
claims are supported by credible evidence.174  Although the court denied 
Connor’s motion for summary judgment, it found that she had established a 
prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation and had presented evidence that 
Sun Trust’s asserted reasons for her termination may have been pretextual.175   
2.  Relevance and Prejudice 
The Connor court expressed its concerns that the defendant’s failure to 
produce the February 12 e-mail could mean other relevant e-mails existed.176  
Because Connor eventually obtained the e-mail, the court could determine its 
relevance.177  Unfortunately, other potentially relevant e-mails that may have 
existed when the duty to preserve arose would have been long deleted at that 
time—either automatically or by human hand.178  Therefore, neither the parties 
nor the court had any way to determine whether other pertinent e-mails 
existed.179  Instead, their existence and relevance is mere speculation.180   
One can reasonably infer the existence of other e-mails only after accepting 
the proposition that the existence of one relevant e-mail makes the existence of 
others probable.  The strength of this proposition is not immediately obvious.  
This determination requires further detailed study to answer questions such as, 
“How often is the discharge of an employee or the elimination of a position the 
subject of multiple messages within a business organization?”   
Fortunately, courts recognize the unseemliness of insisting that a victim of 
spoliation show prejudice when the wrongdoer has deprived that victim of the 
                                           
 173. See, e.g., supra note 130 (discussing several cases involving suits against employers for 
alleged FMLA violations). 
 174. See Working Group I, supra note 33, at 269. 
 175. Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1373–75 (N.D. Ga. 2008).  Connor 
relied on three key facts to support her claim of pretext.  First, Connor cited the temporal 
proximity between her discharge and her return from FMLA leave.  Id. at 1374.  Second, she 
noted that she was discharged while the division she was working in was expanding.  Id.  Third, 
she argued that Sun Trust did not follow its internal policies governing position elimination.  Id. 
at 1374–75.  Sun Trust disputed each of these points and the court ruled that the fact issues 
precluded summary judgment.  Id. 
 176. Id. at 1376. 
 177. See id. at 1366. 
 178. Id. at 1376. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Most class members thought it possible or almost probable that other e-mails concerning 
Connor’s discharge may have existed and may have been destroyed.  One student, however, 
expressed reservations about the court’s theory of prejudice and noted that Connor may not have 
been concerned about other potential e-mails because she was able to obtain the February 12  
e-mail through undisclosed means.  See supra note 137. 
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ability to make such a showing.181  Under certain circumstances, where the 
likely content of unavailable information cannot be determined, courts may 
presume its helpfulness to the innocent party or at least lower the bar for a 
finding of prejudice.182  Although the court did not explicitly address 
presumptions in Connor, it appears to have presumed prejudice because the 
potentially relevant e-mails no longer existed.183  The court’s observation that 
other e-mails may have existed (and that those hypothetical e-mails may have 
been relevant) reduced the plaintiff’s burden in showing prejudice.184 
The evidence also justifies the court’s inference concerning the existence 
and the relevance of other e-mails.  First, the plaintiff’s supervisor sent the 
February 12 e-mail to members of the bank’s senior management team.185  
Therefore, the critical e-mail would have been stored on several e-mail 
accounts—the supervisor’s account and the account of each additional 
recipient.186  Sun Trust Bank’s failure to produce a copy of the e-mail from any 
source suggests at least gross negligence and, potentially, an actual 
conspiracy.187  A conspiracy would implicate bad faith or willful behavior, as 
well as provide strong support for proving relevance because conspirators 
would not cover up irrelevant information.   
Second, Weigel departed from her practice of archiving her e-mails during 
the period of time surrounding Connor’s discharge.188  A sharp departure from 
routine is naturally suspect, giving rise to an argument that documents lost 
during the aberrant period were relevant.  Although not one of these factors 
alone provides sufficient evidence of bad faith or intent, they combine to 
support the trial court’s finding that the potential loss of other relevant e-mails 
prejudiced Connor.189 
Notably, the court did not focus on the potential harm that could have 
resulted from the bank’s failure to produce the February 12 e-mail if Connor 
had not come into possession of it through other means.  A court could justify 
sanctioning discovery misconduct to punish and deter the behavior even 
though no injury resulted; however, courts generally agree that the specific 
sanction of an adverse-inference instruction must be justified by the impact of 
                                           
 181. See, e.g., Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 616 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010). 
 182. In cases of bad faith or willful spoliation, some courts presume prejudice.  See supra 
notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1376. 
 184. See id. 
 185. Id. at 1365–66. 
 186. See id. at 1367 (noting that the e-mail undisputedly was on Weigel’s and Johnson’s 
computers at a minimum). 
 187. See id. 
 188. Id. at 1367–68. 
 189. See id. at 1377. 
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the culpable behavior on discovery and the innocent party’s ability to prove his 
or her claim at trial.190 
3.  Rule 37(e): A Safe Harbor from Spoliation 
Although the Connor court did not discuss the possible application of Rule 
37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whether the rule’s safe-harbor 
provision, which provides an exception to sanctions if the ESI was deleted in 
good faith, could have protected the defendant from sanctions presents an 
interesting issue.191  Rule 37(e) would have afforded no protection to Sun Trust 
from sanctions if the plaintiff’s supervisor intentionally deleted e-mails to 
avoid discovery.192  The rule aims to protect parties unable to produce ESI lost 
as a result of the “routine, good-faith operation” of a computer system—not a 
loss caused by the act of an individual pursuing a litigation strategy.193  The 
Advisory Committee noted that ESI may be deleted for legitimate reasons “that 
have nothing to do with how that information might relate to litigation,” which 
creates a risk of losing relevant information through no fault of that party.194 
Could Sun Trust avail itself of Rule 37(e) if the critical e-mail were 
destroyed automatically after thirty days and not by an employee acting 
intentionally?  The Advisory Committee note states that the safe-harbor 
provision applies to information that was deleted or altered because of the 
routine “good-faith” operation of the system that maintained that 
information.195  Rule 37(e) does not define “good faith,” but the Advisory 
Committee note states that good faith may require a party to intervene in the 
routine operation of an information system to preserve information subject to a 
preservation obligation.196  The note clarifies that a party does not act in good 
faith if it “exploit[s] the routine operation of an information system to thwart 
discovery obligations by allowing that operation to continue in order to destroy 
specific stored information that it is required to preserve.”197   
February 22 was the latest possible date that a preservation duty could have 
arisen in Connor.198  Sun Trust issued preservation instructions at that time, but 
                                           
 190. See Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that an  
adverse-inference instruction serves the remedial purpose “of restoring the prejudiced party to the 
same position he would have been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by the opposing 
party”). 
 191. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (providing that a court may not impose sanctions on a 
party that fails to provide ESI that was maintained by the “good-faith” operation of an ESI 
system), with Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1376 (concluding that Sun Trust acted in bad faith). 
 192. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 193. Id. 37(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1366–67 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (noting 
that counsel for Sun Trust Bank issued a preservation order on February 22). 
2012] Electronic Discovery and Sanctions for Spoliation 801 
the opinion does not explain if the bank altered or suspended its policy of 
automatically deleting all e-mails from the server after thirty days.199  Thus, 
even if destruction of the critical e-mail occurred due to routine system 
operations, the safe-harbor exception would be unavailing.200  Sun Trust had 
failed to act affirmatively to prevent the system from destroying discoverable 
information after a duty to preserve had attached.201   
Similarly, nothing in the opinion suggests that Sun Trust made any effort 
after February 22 to preserve the daily disaster-recovery backup tapes, which 
may have contained discoverable data.202  Under the bank’s policy, these tapes 
were retained for seven to ten days and then overwritten.203  Ordinarily, backup 
tapes are considered to be not “reasonably accessible” because the process of 
restoring them is costly.204  As such, the backup tapes might not be subject to a 
litigation hold.205  But, if they were also used for information retrieval, they 
could be considered sources reasonably accessible that must be preserved.206   
 Rule 37(e) does not address the preservation of sources that are not 
reasonably accessible and the Advisory Committee notes provide little 
guidance.207  However, the notes also suggest that the party making the 
preservation decision on inaccessible sources ought to consider whether the 
information will likely be discoverable and whether it is otherwise available 
from reasonably accessible sources.208  Such decisions are left to the parties, 
with little guidance from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
V.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
In early 2000, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules began a process that 
resulted in the adoption in 2006 of new rules that specifically address the 
discovery of ESI.209  The new discovery rules, however, do not focus on issues 
                                           
 199. Id. at 1367. 
 200. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 201. In Stevenson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., the railroad had destroyed a relevant voice 
tape through its routine procedure of recording over voice tapes after ninety days.  354 F.3d 739, 
747 (8th Cir. 2004).  However, the Eighth Circuit upheld the trial court’s determination that the 
railroad acted in bad faith even though it destroyed the tape under its routine procedure.  Id. 
 202. Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1367–68.  In Doe v. Norwalk Community College, the court 
found that the defendants’ conduct, which included a failure to stop the routine destruction of 
backup tapes, constituted gross negligence.  248 F.R.D. 372, 380 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 203. Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1367. 
 204. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 319–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 205. See id. (“A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from 
sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”). 
 206. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s note (stating that whether sources not readily 
accessible should be preserved “depends on the circumstances of each case”). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1366–68. 
 209. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
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concerning the preservation of electronic data or sanctions for its spoliation.210  
Courts continue to be the primary source for the law in these areas.211   
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is now considering whether it 
should propose new rules governing preservation and sanctions for the 
spoliation of ESI212 and recently directed its Discovery Subcommittee to 
evaluate the merits of a rule-based approach.213  The Subcommittee thereafter 
met repeatedly to examine varying rule-based approaches and potential rule 
amendments.214  In December 2011, the Advisory Committee requested that 
the Subcommittee recommend a course of action at the Advisory Committee 
meeting in March 2012.215   
After receiving the Committee’s directive, the Subcommittee engaged the 
Federal Judicial Center to study motions in federal court for sanctions based on 
spoliation; the study found that such motions were relatively rare—especially 
in cases involving ESI.216  It also commissioned Chief Counsel Andrea 
Kuperman’s 104-page study on preservation and spoliation issues.217  Further, 
the Subcommittee sought to educate itself on a rule-based approach to 
preservation and sanctions by obtaining insights from individuals and 
                                           
 210. A leading casebook on civil procedure states: 
The problem of evidence preservation is particularly acute in the case of electronic 
information because the information is often widely dispersed (an employee may have 
data not only at work, but on her Blackberry, cell-phone, laptop or home computer) and 
is constantly changing on account of routine back-up and deletion programs, as well as 
the day to day manipulation of data in the course of the company’s business. 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL CASES AND 
MATERIALS 973 (10th ed. 2009). 
 211. Id. at 905. 
 212. Dec. 2 Memo, supra note 7, at 2–6. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 2–3, 6. 
 215. Letter from Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, & 
David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to the Honorable Trent Franks, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Comm. on the Judiciary (Dec. 9, 2011), in 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PHOENIX, AZ, JAN. 5–6, 2012, at 175, 
179 (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda% 
20Books/Standing/ST2012-01.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks. 
 216. LEE, supra note 5, at 1. 
 217. Searching a Westlaw database that included all federal court decisions, including 
appellate, district, and bankruptcy cases, Kuperman examined a representative sample of cases 
having the most significant discussions of key spoliation issues.  Memorandum from Andrea 
Kuperman to the Discovery Subcomm. 1 & 2 n.1 (Sept. 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/DallasMiniConf_Materials/Case%20L
aw%20on%20Elements%20of%20a%20Potential%20Preservation%20Rule.pdf.  Although the 
memorandum does not purport to be an exhaustive summary of all the case law in every circuit, it 
provides the reader with a clear idea of the key issues on which courts differ in spoliation cases. 
Id. at 2 n.1. 
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organizations knowledgeable in electronic discovery.218  To that end, the 
Subcommittee conducted a “mini-conference” in Dallas in September 2011 
attended by Subcommittee members, some members of the full Committee, 
and about twenty-five invited participants—including academics, technology 
experts, and representatives from the Department of Justice.219   
To foster discussion, the Subcommittee prepared and supplied attendees 
with a memorandum, which outlined three general categories of  
rule-based approaches to preservation and sanction.220  The memorandum 
emphasized that the Subcommittee had not decided which of these three 
approaches it favored—or whether it favored a rule-based approach at all.221  
The memorandum expressed concerns with a rule-based approach to 
preservation.222  First, it said that a rule purporting to regulate only  
pre-litigation preservation—a “front end” rule—might raise questions 
concerning the scope of rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act, 
                                           
 218. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Honorable David Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. 
on Civil Rules, & Professor Richard Marcus, Assoc. Reporter, Advisory Comm., to Participants 
in Sept. 9 Mini-Conference on Pres. & Sanctions (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter Agenda],  
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/DallasMini 
Conf_Materials/Proposed%20Agenda.pdf. 
 219. Notes from Discovery Subcomm. Mini-Conference (Sept. 9, 2011), in ADVISORY 
COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, WASHINGTON, D.C., NOVEMBER 7–8, 2011, at 127, 129 (2011) 
[hereinafter Subcomm. Mini-Conference], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2011-1.pdf. 
 220. Memo on Pres. & Sanction Issues, supra note 6, at 1–2.  The draft rules for categories 1 
and 2 addressed the preservation of ESI and included three common provisions: (1) a “general 
duty to preserve” provision requiring persons who “reasonably expect” to be a party to a federal 
action to preserve “discoverable” information if they become aware of certain facts or 
circumstances; (2) a provision that would excuse a compliant party from sanctions; and (3) a 
provision that would authorize courts to “employ” any Rule 37(b) sanction and to inform a jury of 
a failure to preserve information.  Id. at 3–4, 14–16, 18, 20–21.  The specificity of terms used in 
the draft rules distinguishes category 1 from category 2.  Id. at 1.  The draft category 1 rule 
identifies the specific digital data that ordinarily would need to be preserved.  Id. at 3.  Based on 
the idea that precise rules would provide bright-line guidance, the draft category 1 rule would also 
(1) identify the acts or events that triggered a duty to preserve; (2) list the kinds of information 
which, absent agreement or court order, could be “presumptively excluded from the preservation 
duty”; (3) limit the retroactivity of the duty; and (4) specify the number of custodians whose 
information must be included if they became aware of certain facts or circumstances.  Id. at 4–11.  
The draft category 2 rule addresses preservation more generally.  Id. at 18.  It only lists the 
alternative acts or events that would trigger a duty to preserve.  Id. at 18–20.  It neither identifies 
the ESI required to be preserved, nor does it specify how long discoverable evidence should be 
preserved.  Id. at 18–19.  The Subcommittee also proposed a category 3 rule, which it referred to 
as a “back end” rule because it does not have any specific preservation provisions and would 
authorize sanctions only when a party did not “reasonably preserve.”  Id. at 22.  The category 3 
draft rule listed various factors for a court to consider—such as anticipation of litigation, use of a 
litigation hold, proportionality concerns, and whether a party sought timely guidance from the 
court.  Id. at 22–24. 
 221. Id. at 2. 
 222. Id. at 1. 
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but that a “back end” sanctions rule might not.223  Second, although the 
memorandum acknowledged that some preservation obligations might be 
costly or burdensome, it questioned whether rulemaking would solve those 
problems.224 
The mini-conference was highly successful.  The views expressed were 
diverse and controversial.225  The Advisory Committee’s Report to the 
Standing Committee, dated December 2, 2011, summarized the overall 
discussion of various topics at the mini-conference.226   For example, 
participants discussed the potential economic and reputational costs associated 
with the over-preservation of potentially discoverable information.227 
After the mini-conference, Subcommittee members discussed the event in 
two conference calls.228  One participant argued that further development of 
case law would prove more effective at dealing with new situations than a 
rules-based approach.229  Another participant offered the contrary view that in 
order to avoid sanctions, many corporations will engage in  
over-preservation—a problem that can only be solved by crafting a responsive 
rule.230  The Subcommittee concluded the conference calls by agreeing to 
focus on developing a rule to regulate sanctions.231 
The Subcommittee expressed its preference for the category 3 approach 
following the mini-conference.232  The Subcommittee agreed that a 
preservation rule would not be useful considering how difficult developing 
such a rule would be.233  At the November 2011 meeting of the Advisory 
Committee, the Subcommittee sought direction from the full Committee,234  
ordered the Subcommittee to continue pursing all approaches and to report 
again in March 2012.235 
                                           
 223. Id.  The Subcommittee considered that even a “back end” sanctions rule, if it impinged 
too much on pre-litigation decision making regarding preservation, might raise questions 
concerning rulemaking authority.  Id. 
 224. Id. (noting that some rules might be too general to be effective, while others would be so 
specific that they would be inapplicable with changes in technology). 
 225. Written submissions and materials can be found on the U.S. Courts website.  Dallas 
Conference, supra note 6. 
 226. Dec. 2 Memo, supra note 7, at 1–6. 
 227. Id. at 3–4. 
 228. Notes from Sept. 20, 2011 Discovery Subcommittee Call, in ADVISORY COMM. ON 
CIVIL RULES, supra note 219, at 111, 111; Notes from Sept. 13, 2011 Discovery Subcommittee 
Call, in ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra  note 219, at 117, 119. 
 229. Notes from Sept. 20, 2011 Discovery Subcommittee Call, supra note 228, at 111. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 116. 
 232. Agenda Memorandum for the Sept. 9, 2011 Discovery Subcommittee, in ADVISORY 
COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 219, at 53. 56. 
 233. Id. at 66. 
 234. See Dec. 2 Memo, supra 7 note, at 6. 
 235. Id. 
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Any rulemaking proposal that the Advisory Committee might make will be 
processed under the Rules Enabling Act, which requires review by the Judicial 
Conference, the Supreme Court, and Congress.236  The issues under 
consideration are controversial and the issuance of new rules could take years. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For a host of reasons, Connor proved to be useful pedagogically because the 
spoliation of ESI, even in a garden-variety FMLA lawsuit, raised novel issues 
of fact, law, and policy.237  First, the fact issues require complicated 
inquiries—not only of a party’s computer-operations and  
document-management policies, but also whether, and to what degree, the 
human behavior that resulted in the destruction of ESI was culpable.  Usually, 
as in Connor, the evidence of who did what, when, and why is only 
circumstantial; inferences must be drawn concerning the intentions or conduct 
of key players.238  Second, the decision shows how spoliation can undermine 
litigation intended to vindicate public policies, such as those embodied in 
legislation regulating employment. 
Third, Connor piqued student interest and stimulated classroom discussion 
because questions raised by the court’s rulings and the underlying facts 
allowed differing perspectives. Class members disagreed, for example, over 
the level of Sun Trust’s culpability, particularly concerning whether Weigel 
may have concealed the February 12 e-mail to harm Connor’s case.239 
The class was also divided on the court’s choice of a proper sanction.  
Students commented that a judge should select a sanction commensurate with 
the varying degrees of culpability and prejudice.  Because class members 
generally agreed that the prejudice to the plaintiff was attenuated, no student 
suggested that the court grant the plaintiff summary judgment because of the 
spoliation.  Although an adverse-inference instruction is itself a harsh sanction, 
most agreed that it was appropriate because they believed that Weigel 
intentionally deleted the e-mail, which deserves a deterrent.  However, a few 
                                           
 236. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74 (2006). 
 237. See Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1366–68 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
 238. Id. at 1366–68, 1376. 
 239. The Connor court concluded that its finding of bad-faith conduct did not require 
malice—a separate category, which implies an intent to harm the opponent. Id. at 1376.  In fact, 
courts are split over what actually constitutes bad faith.  Compare Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC 
v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 635 (D. Colo. 2007) (defining bad faith as a “dishonest 
purpose” including “wrongdoing or some motive of self-interest” (quoting Attorneys Title 
Guaranty Fund v. Goodman, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1277 (D. Utah 2001))), with Stevenson v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 747 (8th Cir. 2004) (requiring an indication of a bad-faith 
intent to obstruct or suppress the truth before issuing an adverse-inference instruction), and 
Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing bad faith 
from merely willful conduct), and Gumbs v. Int’l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3rd Cir. 1983) 
(requiring only actual suppression or withholding of evidence for an adverse-inference 
instruction). 
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saw the instruction as draconian and said that the court should have imposed a 
lesser penalty, such as a small fine. 
Fourth, Connor illustrates the tremendous choice that trial courts have in 
their fact-specific approach to questions concerning spoliation and sanctions.  
The determinations made in that indefinite, highly subjective process are 
committed to the trial judge’s sound discretion and reversed on appeal only for 
a clear abuse of discretion.240 
Finally, the case demonstrates who fashions much of the law of spoliation.  
Discovery rulings are usually not final judgments and thus are not immediately 
appealable.241  Because most cases later settle or are disposed of on grounds 
other than a discovery ruling, few such rulings remain appealable.242 As a 
direct consequence, trial courts and magistrate judges make much of the law on 
discovery.243  Prime examples are the important discovery rulings by Judge 
Scheindlin in Zubulake and Pension Committee and Judge Rosenthal in 
Rimkus.244  No appellate court had occasion to review the discovery orders in 
those landmark trial court decisions. 
It is a near certainty that advances in technology will profoundly affect the 
tasks that tomorrow’s lawyers may perform in dealing with the preservation, 
discovery, and spoliation of ESI.  At this point in time—when rulemaking is in 








                                           
 240. Appellate rulings on spoliation may be based on a trial court’s findings of fact, or its 
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